Though minor in comparison to the clash that would erupt at Bull Run days later, the fight at Blackburn’s Ford rattled Union confidence and emboldened Confederate troops. With McDowell now seeking another route forward, the war’s first major battle loomed just beyond the horizon.
Confederate Brig. Gen. Pierre Gustave Toutant-Beauregard arrived at Manassas Junction on June 2 to take command of the Alexandria Line, later known as the Army of the Potomac. The 43-year-old Louisiana Creole had previously led the forces that compelled Fort Sumter’s surrender in April. After evaluating his troops and the terrain, he proposed a grand offensive maneuver, but the Confederate War Department in Richmond dismissed it as impractical.
Forced into a defensive stance, Beauregard followed a strategy of withdrawing from forward positions to protect the junction of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and the Manassas Gap Railroad along Bull Run. If necessary, Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of the Shenandoah could be swiftly transported to the area via the Manassas Gap Railroad. Beauregard’s defensive plan relied on 21,000 infantry and cavalry to guard multiple crossing points along Bull Run, from the Warrenton Pike to Union Mills.
On the evening of July 3, Brig. Gen. Milledge L. Bonham ordered Col. Joseph B. Kershaw and the 2nd South Carolina Infantry to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force toward Falls Church. Before sunrise, Kershaw set out with six infantry companies, cavalry (including Warrenton’s Black Horse Troop) and a section of artillery from the 1st Company, Richmond Howitzers. He aimed to ambush a Union patrol reportedly in the area. After setting his trap near Mills Cross Roads, Black Horse scouts rode ahead but were mistakenly fired at upon their return, mortally wounding two and injuring a third. The disastrous Independence Day expedition ended any further thoughts of an offensive movement.
Meanwhile, on June 29, Union Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell met in Washington, D.C., with President Abraham Lincoln and Lieutenant General Winfield Scott to plan a march on Richmond, Virginia, the newly established Confederate capital. McDowell doubted that his small, inexperienced army was ready, but Lincoln pressured him to act, as many of the 90-day volunteer enlistments would expire by the end of July. The initial plan called for 30,000 men to advance around Beauregard’s right flank, beginning on July 8, but McDowell did not start moving until July 16. By then, he had approximately 34,000 infantry and cavalry present for duty.
As soon as McDowell’s men left their camps, his meticulous plan began to unravel. The inexperience and lack of discipline among his troops, combined with a shortage of cavalry and a poor understanding of the terrain beyond his immediate front, turned an 18-mile march into a two-day slog. Col. Orlando B. Willcox’s brigade reached Fairfax Station at noon on July 17. The following morning, Col. Israel B. Richardson’s brigade arrived in Centreville, only to find it eerily quiet and devoid of Confederates, with abandoned earthworks and scattered military accoutrements marking their former presence.
At Centreville, McDowell ordered Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler’s division to search for a crossing over Bull Run about three miles south at Blackburn or Mitchell’s Fords. Tyler advanced along the road with two companies from Richardson’s brigade and a squadron of cavalry. At Blackburn’s Ford, he spotted only a few Confederate artillery pieces. However, Brig. Gen. James Longstreet’s brigade, consisting of three Virginia regiments, was concealed in the woods on the opposite shore. Capt. Delaware Kemper’s four 6-pounder guns from the Alexandria Artillery were positioned about half a mile west on the north side of Bull Run at Mitchell’s Ford, supported by the 7th and 2nd South Carolina Regiments on the south side.
Despite orders to avoid engagement, Tyler directed two long-range rifled guns from Captain Romeyn B. Ayres’ 3rd U.S. Artillery, Company E, to open fire. Kemper’s battery, unable to match their range, withdrew across the creek. Tyler then shifted focus to Blackburn’s Ford, where artillery bombardment damaged Wilmer McLean’s house, kitchen, and barn about a mile south. He ordered Richardson’s brigade forward, led by a mixed 160-man battalion under Capt. Robert Brethschneider.
Longstreet’s Virginians displayed remarkable restraint for inexperienced troops, lulling the attackers into a false sense of security. Tyler, overconfident, believed he could force a crossing of Bull Run, seize Manassas Junction, and end the campaign in one stroke. Instead, his troops charged headlong into a well-prepared Confederate position.
Around 1 p.m., the 12th New York Infantry, led by Col. Ezra L. Walrath, advanced but quickly took cover under a “murderous” volley. Both sides called for reinforcements. The remainder of Richardson’s brigade, comprising the 1st Massachusetts and the 2nd and 3rd Michigan regiments, moved up to assist, while Longstreet received support from the 7th Louisiana and 7th and 24th Virginia.
The 12th New York broke and fled in the heat and confusion. Sensing an opportunity, Longstreet ordered the 17th and 1st Virginia regiments to pursue across the creek, but the inexperienced troops became disorganized on the opposite bank. Both sides suffered from friendly fire incidents, with Longstreet himself narrowly escaping shots from the 7th Virginia.
Assessing the situation, Tyler ordered Richardson’s brigade to withdraw. After several hours of fighting, 83 Union and 68 Confederate soldiers lay dead or wounded. The engagement concluded with an inconsequential artillery duel, serving only to add more names to the casualty lists.
The casualties were minor compared to the First Battle of Bull Run, which would take place nearby just days later, but the skirmish set the stage for what was to come. The Confederate victory boosted the morale of their inexperienced troops while discouraging their Union counterparts. Bruised by the setback at Blackburn’s Ford, McDowell chose to shift west and flank the Confederate army at Stone Bridge over Bull Run, setting the stage for the war’s first major battle.
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