HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF NORTHWESTERN VIRGINIA,
Camp at Laurel Hill, Va., June 25, 1861.
SIR: I reached Huttonsville on the 14th instant. I found there twenty-three companies of infantry, mostly mustered into service, but in a miserable condition as to arms, clothing, equipments, instruction, and discipline. Twenty of these companies were organized into two regiments, the one under Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson and the other under Lieutenant-Colonel Heck. Though wholly incapable, in my judgment, of rendering anything like efficient service, I deemed it of such importance to possess myself of the two turnpike passes over the Rich and Laurel Mountains, before they should be seized by the enemy, that I left Huttonsville on the evening of the 15th with these two regiments and Captain Rice’s battery, and, by marching them a greater portion of the night, reached the two passes early in the afternoon of the following day, Colonel Heck’s regiment and a section of artillery occupying the Buckhannon Pass, and Colonel Jackson, with the remaining section, taking up their position here.
I regard these two passes as the gates to the northwestern country, and, had they been occupied by the enemy, my command would have been effectually paralyzed or shut up in the Cheat River Valley. I think it was a great mistake on the part of the enemy not to have remained here after driving Colonel Porterfield’s command over it. I have caused all the country roads leading from the northwest into the Cheat Mountain and Saint George, the county seat of Tucker County, to be blocked up by cutting large trees across them. I have done this to prevent the enemy from getting into my rear and cutting off my supplies, which, so far, I have been obliged to obtain chiefly from Staunton.
By sending out heavy escorts I am now endeavoring to collect grain and cattle, both from the direction of Philippi and Buckhannon. I have made Beverly for the present my principal depot. I propose in a few days to send the three small companies left at Huttonsville, six miles farther south, to the foot of Cheat Mountain, where, in a strong position, which I shall improve, I shall establish them, and deposit two days’ supplies for my entire command.
The road from Saint George to Cheat River Bridge, on the railroad, is a country road, and scarcely practicable for wheels. My last information, which is, of course, not very reliable, is that the enemy have blocked up this road from the Cheat Bridge to where it is crossed by the Northwestern turnpike, which leads by Evansville to Grafton. If this proves to be true, it will increase my difficulties in getting on this railroad very much. Should they have done the same thing on all the roads crossing the railroad from the south, they will have put the railroad, I fear, beyond the reach of my present force. This force I consider more than sufficient to hold these two passes, but not sufficient to hold the railroad. If I should get an opportunity of seizing it at any particular point; for I must have an adequate force in each of the passes to secure them for our use. My best chance of getting at the railroad seems at present to be by the Morgantown road, a road which leads from Yeager’s (see map) to Evansville. When once at Evansville, which is on the Northwestern turnpike, I should threaten equally Grafton (twelve miles distant) and Cheat Bridge (fourteen miles distant), at both of which points they now have a force which they would be compelled to keep in this position, and thus enable me to get at the road at Independence, five miles from Evansville, destroy it there, and then fall upon the force at Cheat Bridge (by marching on the railroad) before it could be re-enforced from Grafton. The objection to this operation is that it enables the enemy at Philippi to throw himself upon my rear. If, however, I had sufficient force to hold this post securely, my remaining force could regain it from Cheat Bridge, by way of Saint George, with a little work on that road; the roads from Philippi leading over the Laurel Mountain into that road, not in number, having, as I have already stated, been blocked up by me. My moving force (say three thousand), however, will not be sufficient, I fear, for this operation.
The various accounts which I get of the enemy’s strength (none positive or even reliable) represent him as having from four to seven thousand at Philippi, with from six to ten pieces of artillery, and that he is intrenched on the hill behind the town, about three thousand at Grafton, three or four thousand at Clarksburg, and about two thousand at Cheat Bridge. I have been, so far, wholly unable to get anything like accurate or reliable information as to the numbers, movements, or intentions of the enemy, and begin to believe it almost an impossibility. The Union men are greatly in the ascendency here, and are much more zealous and active in their cause than the secessionists. The enemy are kept fully advised of our movements, even to the strength of our scouts and pickets, by the country people, while we are compelled to grope in the dark as much as if we were invading a foreign and hostile country.
The Georgia regiment reached me yesterday. I hear nothing definite about the two remaining companies of the Twentieth Regiment, and the four remaining companies of Colonel Fulkerson’s. There has elapsed scarcely time for me to hear of the result of my application for two additional companies of cavalry. They are greatly needed here. The maps give very incorrect impressions as to the number of roads in this region of country.
I have heard nothing of the medical stores for my command, nor of other requisitions made on the Ordnance and Quartermaster’s Departments. I hope that they may be urged to fill them as speedily as possible. Many of my men are without blankets or tents. The nights are frequently cold and we have frequent rains.
I shall have the defenses of this place complete in a week. The Buckhannon Pass is naturally much stronger, and the regiment there will be able to hold five times their number in check for a sufficient time to admit of being re-enforced, if they will stand to their work.
At Philippi the enemy occupy the heights beyond the town, in the direction of Grafton. They have mined the bridge and thrown abatis in the ford. It is further said that they have blocked up the road on this side of Philippi. Until I can get some additional cavalry I shall not have adequate means of determining to what extent these reports are true.
This communication is rather lengthy, I fear, for the general to read, but, as I do not propose to trouble him often, I have deemed it best to report fully the condition of things under my command.
Two companies of infantry are being organized in Beverly, under Colonel Porterfield, whom I have assigned temporarily to the command of that place. Captain Rice’s company is also ordered to form part of his command, after turning over his battery to Captain Anderson. Accessions to my command come in very slowly.
No periodical muster rolls for June 30 have yet arrived, nor any other blank forms. The general’s order, in relation to the court of inquiry, had already been anticipated. The proceedings will be forwarded in a day or two. I was aware of the road by Stribling Springs, but it is impossible to cut off all communication with the enemy. The mass of the country people is against us.
I have already addressed several communications to General Cooper, and asked for instructions as to the proper person to address. Be pleased to inform me on this point.
At the end of this month I shall send a return of my force. I am pushing the instruction of the men with all possible activity.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. S. GARNETT,
Brigadier-General, Provisional Army, Commanding.
Lieut. Col. GEORGE DEAS,
Asst. Adjt. and Insp. Gen., C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.
Sources
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Vol. II. With additions and corrections. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902.
Spirit of '61 