At the date of my report, Major-General McClellan relinquished the command in western Virginia. The report, on that account, was made in duplicate, and one copy of it delivered with the accompanying documents to Major-General McClellan and another to Brigadier-General Rosecrans. Those commanders, having knowledge of the instructions under which I acted and of the extent of my duties, as also of the official reports and correspondence prior to July 17, and of the topography of the country, could see the bearing and relation of matters in the foregoing reports as the public might not without some additional facts, which now are submitted.
My Brigade proper, as ordered by Major-General McClellan, consisted of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-second Ohio Regiments, with several detached companies of Virginia infantry, one company of cavalry, and one of artillery, and for portions of the time, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Ohio Regiments were attached to my command. With these troops I was required to garrison and hold both lines of railroads from Rowlesburg to Wheeling and Parkersburg, and the country adjacent thereto, and south towards the Kanawha, up the Cheat River, and eastward to West Union.
The written instructions from Major [Seth] Williams, Assistant Adjutant-General, prescribing my duties contained the following language: “The commanding General instructs me to add that he has entrusted to you the most important duty, next to his own, in this territory, viz.: That of securing the base of his operations and his line of retreat. At any cost, that of your last man, you will preserve the Cheat River line, Grafton, and the line thence to Wheeling. On this depends the entire success of the line of operations.”
To strengthen and support the columns of Generals McClellan, Morris, and Cox, troops were drawn from my lines, thus reducing them to the lowest point of safety, so that when I was appealed to, on July 4, send 500 men to Oakland to protect the railroad bridge at that place and keep open our communications east against a strong force of Rebels, not a man could be spared. General McClellan was kept fully advised at all times of everything material for him to know, so that he might give special instructions on any question. Summing up a brief review of my transactions in a dispatch on July 5, he says: “Your course, thus far, has been in all respects judicious and soldierly.”
The instructions were to increase the Cheat River garrison to 1,000 men and supply it with one gun. This was done. Rowlesburg was the point of support on the railroad for this garrison, and in all of Major-General McClellan’s instructions relative to movements on the east of Cheat River, he contemplated Rowlesburg as the Point d’Appui.
The Cheat River column, under Colonel [J.] Irvine, on July 8 consisted of five companies of the Fifteenth Ohio, seven companies of the Sixteenth Ohio, two companies of the First Virginia, and twenty-five cavalry. On July 11 he was reinforced from Grafton with six companies of the Eighth Ohio.
The two Pennsylvania Regiments which Major-General McClellan ordered to join me from Cumberland, Maryland, were cut off by the burning of the bridge on the Baltimore and Ohio Road below New Creek, and that on the Frostburg Road near Piedmont. This was done by the Rebels on July 12. They also destroyed the telegraph lines at the same points. On the evening of the same day I sent advices of these facts to the Department Headquarters, but they were not received there until the next day.
When I received my orders on July 13, it was perfectly apparent that the two Pennsylvania Regiments could not reach me at all and very probable that they had not even received the order to join me. Two complete regiments, then, intended by General McClellan to be promptly in position at what he considered to be exactly the right place, must be dropped from the estimate of forces, and their places filled, as best they might, by small detachments drawn from garrisons between Grafton, Wheeling, and Parkersburg. The result was unavoidable—that the whole expedition must consist of fragmentary regiments and detached companies, almost wholly destitute of means of transportation, to be organized and put in the field in the utmost haste and under no common embarrassments.
Lieutenant-Colonel [John] W. Fuller of my staff had been sent forward to Oakland on July 12 to aid in getting means of transportation for Colonel [H. G.] Depuy’s six companies of the Eighth Ohio over to Chisholm’s Mill, as a reinforcement to Colonel Irvine and did not return to Grafton until the morning of July 14. Orders had been given to hire and, if necessary, impress teams from Oakland and vicinity for the baggage and supplies of Colonel Depuy and Irvine but enough could not be obtained, and a considerable quantity remained at Oakland under a guard from the Eighth Regiment. There was also a company of Home Guards there to protect the railroad bridge. It was reported that some Federal troops had reached Piedmont that might be disposed to co-operate with us.
Having advised Colonel Fuller that I was taking steps to intercept Garnett’s Army, and should move in by way of Oakland, and directed him to remain in the telegraph office and keep me advised until I should reach Rowlesburg, I sent him the following telegrams:
GRAFTON,
July 13, 3 p.m.
COLONEL FULLER: Order all the men over from Oakland that can be spared, with one day’s cooked rations, if possible, but do not wait to cook. Retain all the teams not needed to send forward until I telegraph you from Rowlesburg.
ROWLESBURG,
July 13.
COLONEL FULLER: Have teams and guides ready on our arrival at Oakland. We will be there by 7.45 p.m. Send forces from Piedmont to reinforce at Junction, with our forces on northwest pike, near Chisholm’s Mill, as soon as possible. On our arrival you and Captain Dayton will return to Grafton, where you will take command.
It hardly need be repeated that the first train did not reach Oakland until 11 p.m., that we could get no teams and received no troops from Piedmont.
In making Oakland instead of Rowlesburg the point of departure from the railroad, thus deviating from the plan of Major-General McClellan, I was influenced by considerations of distance, want of transportation, the condition of roads, and the supposed locality of Colonel Irvine. From Rowlesburg up the Cheat River to the northwest pike was five miles; thence to West Union, eight miles; thence to Chisholm’s Mill, six miles; and to the Red House—total, twenty-one miles. From Rowlesburg to Oakland, by railroad, twenty-three miles; thence to Chisholm’s Mill, eight and a half miles; or from Oakland to Red House Junction, nine miles.
To march an army from Rowlesburg to Red House would ordinarily require from ten to twelve hours, whereas from Rowlesburg via Oakland to Red House would not require over five or six hours. Transportation of supplies and fatigue of men should be thought of. The space from Cheat River to the Red House (sixteen miles) has been alluded to by many editors and letter writers who had heard something about that country, as a Gap through which the Rebel Army escaped. Seven different roads diverge and run northerly from Leadsville and intersect the northwest pike within that Gap!
The Horse Shoe Run Road, running northerly through Carrick’s Ford and intersecting the northwest pike at the Red House, comes in on “the glades,” where the surface and appearance of the country are a good deal like that around Bellevue, Huron County, Ohio—cleared farms, long stretches of natural meadows, gentle elevations, and small patches of forest. For three or four miles about the Red House, the roads and fields are practicable for cavalry and artillery.
A word about the march of my little Army of 5,400 men into Hardy County, West Virginia. It was enough for me to know, upon the most reliable reports of scouts from different directions, all corroborating each other, that the country was so clear of the enemy in force as to leave us very few to meet, other than the remains of Garnett’s Army. I could only have said at the time that the Rebel Army under General Johnston was going and had gone South. But the reading public found out next Sunday that they were seen at Manassas!
Had Major-General McClellan known the facts as I knew them, I have no reason to suppose that he would have ordered me to abandon the pursuit as he did do.
CHARLES W. HILL.
Sources
Hewett, Janet B., Noah Andre Trudeau, and Bryce A, Suderow, eds., Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Pt. I, Vol. 1. Wilmington: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1994.
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