CHARLESTOWN, VA., July 18, 1861.
COLONEL: I arrived at this place on the 17th instant. Nothing of importance occurred on the march. The principal inhabitants left some ten days since, anticipating its occupation by the Federal troops. It was till our arrival the location of a band of secession militia, engaged in pressing into service the young men of the country.
I have to acknowledge the receipt of two telegrams from the General-in-Chief of the 17th and 18th instants, both looking to a movement and attack upon Winchester. A state of affairs existed which the General-in-Chief is not aware of, though in some respects anticipated by his instructions that if I found the enemy too strong to attack, to threaten and make demonstrations to retain him at Winchester. I more than carried out the wishes of the General-in-Chief in this respect.
Before I left Martinsburg I was informed of a large increase to Johnston’s command, and the visit to Winchester of the leading members of the Confederate Army. Just before General McDowell was to strike I advanced to Bunker Hill, causing surprise, and, I have since learned, an additional increase of force.
On Tuesday I sent out a reconnoitering party toward Winchester. It drove in the enemy’s pickets, and caused the army to be formed in line of battle, anticipating an attack from my main force. This party found the road barricaded and blocked by fallen trees. The following day I left for this place.
Before marching from Martinsburg I heard of the mutterings of many of the volunteer regiments, and their expressed determination not to serve one hour after their term of service should expire. I anticipated a better expression of opinion as we approached the enemy, and hoped to hear of a willingness to remain a week or ten days. I was disappointed, and when I prepared for a movement to the front, by an order for the men to carry two days’ provisions in their haversacks, I was assailed by earnest remonstrances against being detained over their time—complaints from officers of want of shoes and other clothing—all throwing obstacles in the way of active operations. Indeed, I found I should, if I took Winchester, be without men, and be forced to retreat, and thus lose the fruits of victory. Under the circumstances neither I nor those on whom I could rely could advance with any confidence. I am, therefore, now here with a force which will be dwindling away very rapidly. I to-day appealed almost in vain to the regiments to stand by the country for a week or ten days. The men are longing for their homes, and nothing can detain them.
I sent Captain Newton to-day to Harper’s Ferry to arrange for defense and re-establish communication with Maryland; also, the Massachusetts regiment. The Third Wisconsin will soon be there. Lieutenant Babcock has been at Sandy Hook several days, trying to get the canal in operation, preparing the entrance to ford, putting in operation a ferry, and reconstructing the bridge. Depots for all supplies will soon be established, and then I shall cause to be turned in the camp equipage, &c., of the regiments, and to that place I shall withdraw if I find my force so small as to render my present position unsafe. I cannot intrench sufficiently to defend this place against a large force.
I shall direct the regiments to be sent to Harrisburg and Philadelphia to be mustered out by Captain Hastings, Major Ruff, and Captain Wharton.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. PATTERSON,
Major-General, Commanding.
Col. E. D. TOWNSEND,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., U. S. Army, Washington City.
Sources
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Vol. II. With additions and corrections. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902.
Spirit of '61 